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EAST ELuRoPA CONsTmiTUTONAL REvIEw

Writing constitutions to allow for evolutionary change.

THE PATm

OF THE PRESIDENCY

Lawrence Lessig
Founders in postcommunist democracies take their constitutional texts very seriously. Slovenia, for example,
after enumerating its executive powers, states that these
powers "cannot be extended." The same limitation is
found in some drafts of the constitution offBelarus. These
are founders who want to say now what will be, if not
forever, then at least for a very long time; they are drafters who want to assure that the institutions they now
establish are respectful of the words they now draft.
All this obsession over text is quite understandable.
Coming from a communist past, and trained in a civil
law tradition before that, respect for textual limits is an
important lesson to relearn. But we might ask nonetheless whether this fetish for code-like constitutions is either
useful or realistic. For it has led many to conceive the
question of the division of powers quite statically-asking
what division of power is best, now and in the future, as if
a political system could be fixed in stone like Moses' Ten
Commandments. Less focus on text, and more on how
the constituted institutions are likely to interact, -might
lead to a more dynamic question-what division of power
is best now, to allow a nation, unique in its history and
culture, to evolve into a stable and enduring political system in the future.
The history of the American presidency reveals something of the value in this second question. Ours is the
"imperial presidency"-with the chief executive simultaneously the chief administrator, the leading policymaker
on the national scene, and the exclusive policymaker on
the international scene. Many from postcommunist societies rightly reject this presidency as a model for their
own emerging democracies. America, it is said, had a
long history of democracy before its constitution was born,
and hence a political culture strong enough to resist the
dangers of authoritarianism inherent in any strong executive. The same cannot be said of the democracies
emerging from (at least) forty years of communism. Having suffered most of the century under totalitarian rule,
the region's nascent democracies would be too fragile to

resist the temptations of an authoritarian, even if elected,
president.
The contrast is a good one, and the lesson apt. But it
is instructive to ask just when America achieved this political maturity, or more importantly,j ust when America's
imperial presidency became possible. Modern pretensions notwithstanding, the modern presidency was not a
creation of the founding fathers. Nothing in the text of
1787 suggested a presidency anything like the office now
occupied by President Bill Clinton. Instead, in 1787 the
President was quite a weak executive officer.
To see this, imagine a report about the newly created
office of the president from a Chicago correspondent to
the American Constitutional Convention of 1787.
After a summer of secret sessions, the convention of
1787 (called to draft amendments to the failed Articles of
Confederation) proposed instead a radical, if unauthorized, new constitution. At the core of this document was
a single executive officer, a president, elected by state
electors at a special convention, and constitutionally independent from Congress. But as the drafters were quick to
assure, this president was not to be America's elected
monarch. Rather than possessing strong and broad constitutionally vested executive powers, he was to be a relatively weak executive officer. Indeed the constitution
granted him just five powers unconditioned by the shared
powers of Congress-the power to pardon, to fill vacancies, to order written opinions from executive officers, to
receive ambassadors, and to command the military forces.
(Even these, in part, depend on Congress-the commander-in-chief power, for example, depends upon Congress' declaration of war.) Beyond these five, the
president's powers were powers conditioned by Congress-he had the power to negotiate treaties, that must be
approved by the Senate; the power to appoint officers,
that must be confirmed by the Senate; the power to veto
legislation, that can be overridden by Congress; the power
to recommend legislation, that can be ignored by Congress; the power to convene or adjourn Congress in ex-
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traordinary times, that Congress can negate by its own
similar vote; and finally, the power to "take Care that the
laws be faithfully executed," laws that Congress itself
sets. Not unlike the relatively weak presidencies recently
established in Hungary and the Czech Republic, most of
the American president's important powers, then, were
powers significantly conditioned by Congress.
Overall, not a terribly strong executive power, and
fundamentally unlike the current American presidency.
Unlike his Bulgarian counterpart, he had no power over
citizenship; unlike the Polish or Romanian presidents, he
was not directly elected; unlike the Hungarian president,
he had no constitutional power to "watch over the democratic functions of state."
The practices of the first U.S. presidents confirm this
original reading. Unlike the modern policy-making executive, the first presidents were embarrassed to advise
Congress on presidential views of legislation. As Washington wrote to a friend, "Motives of delicacy have uniformly restrained the [president] from introducing any
topic which relates to legislative matters to members of
either house of Congress, lest it should be suspected that
he wished to influence the question before it." (Leonard
D. White, The Federalists:A Study in Administrative History
55 [1948].) Even in 1887, when Cleveland urged Congress to pass liberalized trade regulation, Congress was
shocked by the president's invasion of the legislative domain. (Louis Fisher, The Politics of SharedPower: Congress
and the Executive 26 [1987].) The early presidents understood their role to be relatively passive; they exercised
their power to advise Congress in just the way a parent
advises a teenage son-carefully, infrequently, and with
little expectation of acquiescence.
As originally framed, and originally practiced, then,
the original president's power was slight. But what is
important for our purposes is not this historical understanding, but rather, what accounts for the current
presidency's deviation from that past. How has the presidency grown from this modest beginning to, in some
eyes, a monster of centralized power today? What, in
Vojtech Cepl's words, breathed the "life into his office"?
First, and most importantly, the transformation came
not by any change in the constitutional text. No amendment vested in the president any more power than he
possessed in 1789. And second, the change came in full
view of Congress: this was not a presidency established in

a constitutional putsch; it was a presidency gained with
the knowing acquiescence of many Congresses.
So if neither amendment nor force was used, what
accounts for the change? In part the remarkable growth
of presidential authority follows from an often overlooked
aspect of Congress' power, and in balance, from an often
ignored history of slow and mutual presidential and congressional accommodation. This was a presidency the
American democracy had to learn, and like all learning, it
took time.
Consider first the part of this transformation owing
to Congress' power. Buried in the constitutional text
outlining Congress' authority is a somewhat obscure grant
of power, known by the framers as the "sweeping clause"
but referred to now as the "necessary and proper clause."
Under this clause, Congress is granted the power to make
"all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution"
notjust Congress's power, but also "all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Most
contemporary commentators thought this clause simply
made explicit what would have been understood in any
case-that there were implied powers under the constitution. Therefore many thought the clause was a redundancy. But this has turned out to be a mistake. For even if
there would have been implied powers without this
clause, what the necessary and proper clause assures is
that it is Congress and not the President which gets to say
what those implied powers are, and more importantly,
how they are to be structured. Congress gets to say this
about any federal power, and thus retains ultimate jurisdiction over any expanding federal power.
The importance in this structural design is easily overlooked, but the history of the American presidency makes
it hard to ignore. At first, Congress exercised broad powers of control over those powers that we would now
consider executive, by vesting them in people other than
the president-including prosecutorial powers vested in
relatively independent department heads, or in state officials, and other powers of execution vested in state officials. More importantly, the first Congresses acted to
assure a relatively weak federal administration. One example gives the overall flavor: Despite constant pleas by
presidents and attorneys general, Congress refused (until
1870) to create a centralized department ofjustice, allowing the prosecution of federal laws to rest with essentially
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independent local prosecutors and in some cases, state
prosecutors. For most of the history of the American
republic, much of the power of the modern presidency
was held in check by ajealous and careful Congress.
Over time, all this has changed. As faith in the presidency grew along with impatience over a factionalized
and corrupt Congress, Congress finally granted the president increasing control over an increasingly centralized
administration. After a century of democratic practice,
and a long tradition of democratic executives, Congress
permitted the evolution of a presidency that without
doubt the founders would have found terrifying. This
was a change long in coming, but critically, it is not a
change best understood as a change in the constitution
itself. For to this day, the full range of the resident's
power survives solely by the grace of Congress. Under
the "sweeping clause" Congress retains broad power to
limit and control-to check-an overzealous executive.
The president's power is a power by structural delegation, but a careful Congress could at anytime recall the
power it has allowed.
No doubt the evolution in the American presidency
is unlike the evolution that can be expected of the executive power in postcommunist democracies. For one thing,
the countries of Eastern Europe that have established a
more-than-ceremonial president are dual-executive democracies. But the constitutional history of the French
Fifth Republic, which created a system of this sort, confirms the lesson we have drawn from the American experience: the growth of presidential power cannot be rigidly controlled by a constitutional text. My point about
the American experience is not so much about a particular evolution that any constitution will follow. Instead, it
is about the nature of a constitution as evolutionary. What
is general is not a particular path of presidential growth,
but that presidencies have a path of growth, and that at
their birth constitutions should understand and accommodate this.
That a practice can be constitutional even if not literally prescribed by a constitutional text is the first general
lesson from this history. Three more specific lessons might
also be suggested. First, while the American experience is
discounted in postcommunist debates, again because of
the preconstitutional democratic traditions in America, it
is useful to remember that even these early democrats
refused constitutionally to entrench a strong executive

power. So fearful were the framers of replicating King
George that they established at first a small and impotent
executive office, and filled it with a not so small (but
importantly) sterile (father of no heirs except the country) President Washington. And except for the extraordinary period surrounding the Civil War, this limited executive power would survive on the American continent
for at least a century. Even on the brink of economic and
political collapse, the framers did not short-circuit the
deliberative-if inefficient, if corruptible, if factionalizedresponsibility of Congress.
Second, what the "sweeping clause" suggests is that
modern constitutionalists should focus less on carving
into stone divided executive and legislative powers, and
more on devising a system that will allow an effective
executive (and Congress) to evolve over time. What the
sweeping clause allowed America was a flexibility that
Congress could exercise, over time and across historical
contexts, in various political battles. This arrangement
helped Congress develop as a democratic institution, while
checking the anti-democratic tendencies of a strong executive-allowing, in short, a period of maturation. What
this suggests for other constitutional regimes is the need
for a similar structural device that would permit a similar
space for parliament and the executive (or executives) to
develop and, more importantly, to develop together.
Such a development will take time and what we might
call political space-the third lesson from the American
experience. Modern constitutionalists, especially rightsfocused constitutionalists, are eager to quash politics in
the name of "correct" constitutional principles, eager to
avoid political struggles, and move quickly to the "right"
constitutional answer, eager to throw law, constitutional
law, into battles inherently political. This may have been
the impatience of Professor/Justice Valeri Zorkin, who,
along with his court of legal academics (9 of the 13 justices were from the academy), like overeager parents,
refused to stand aside and allow political institutions to
resolve their political conflicts politically-through compromise and agreement. But it is just this skill that a
democracy demands. The process of learning this skill, of
learning democracy, cannot be short circuited-no less in
postcommunist democracies today, than in eighteenthcentury America.
Lawrence Lessig is Assistant ProfessorofLaw at the University
of Chicago, the Law School

